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ing functional FANCI-FANCD2, the level of
–1 products did eventually decrease (Fig. 3, B
and C, and fig. S8). However, since the exten-
sion products never accumulated to more than
~30% of the mock-depleted samples (Fig. 3D
and fig. S8), we infer that this decline of –1 pro-
ducts is primarily due to degradation (12). We
conclude that in the absence of FANCI-FANCD2,
nucleotide insertion opposite the cross-linked
base is inhibited. This differs from the effect of
DNA polymerase z immunodepletion, which ar-
rests lesion bypass immediately after the insertion
step (fig. S9) (12).
We next investigated whether FANCI-
FANCD2 is required for incisions, which are
thought to occur on one of the parental strands on
either side of the lesion (2) (Fig. 1A, ii). To visu-
alize incisions, DNA repair intermediates were di-
gested with Hinc II and analyzed by denaturing gel
electrophoresis and Southern blotting (Fig. 4A).
After 40 min, the most abundant species were the
high-molecular-weight parental X-shaped mol-
ecules, as well as 2.3- and 3.3-kb species that
represent stalled nascent strands (Fig. 4B, lane 4).
Dual incisions surrounding the ICL are expected
to convert the parental X-shaped molecule into a
5.6-kb linear product and 2.3- and 3.3-kb frag-
ments (Fig. 4A). As expected, in mock-depleted
extract, we observed a time-dependent decrease
of X-shaped molecules and a concomitant in-
crease in linear species (Fig. 4B, lanes 4 to 9;
quantified in Fig. 4, C and D). The 2.3- and 3.3-kb
species declined over time because of lesion
bypass and/or resection (Fig. 4B). The kinetics of
X-shaped molecule disappearance in this assay
confirmed our previous conclusion (12) that the
majority of incisions occurs after forks reach the
–1 position (fig. S10C).
In the absence of FANCD2, incisions were
severely inhibited, as seen from the persistence of
X-shaped species and a severe delay in the accu-
mulation of linear molecules (Fig. 4B, lanes 10 to
15; quantified in Fig. 4, C and D). In addition, the
2.3- and 3.3-kb fragments persisted longer, likely
because of inhibition of lesion bypass. These
effects were rescued by FANCI-FANCD2WT.
Tracking only the parental strands in this assay
confirmed that incisions are inhibited in the
absence of FANCD2 and showed that the defect
is not rescued by FANCI-FANCD2K562R (fig. S11).
Together, these data show that ubiquitylated
FANCI-FANCD2 is required for efficient inci-
sions surrounding the cross-link.
Finally, we examined the precise timing of
FANCI-FANCD2 ubiquitylation. As shown in
fig. S12C, FANCI and FANCD2 ubiquitylation
correlated with the arrival of leading strands at
the –1 position, consistent with a role for the
FANCI-FANCD2 complex in the insertion and
incision steps, which occur after forks reach the
–1 position (12) (figs. S10 and S12).
Using a chemically homogeneous cisplatin
ICL and a bona fide repair assay, we show that
the Fanconi anemia pathway is required for DNA
replication–coupled ICL repair. These results
explain why Fanconi anemia cells treated with
ICL-inducing agents arrest late in S phase (11)
and eventually die. We further demonstrate that
FANCI-FANCD2 must be ubiquitylated to sup-
port repair, which suggests that its role in this
process involves direct binding to the lesion. In
the absence of FANCI-FANCD2, incisions near
the ICL and translesion synthesis (TLS) past the
lesion are severely inhibited, defining two critical
steps in ICL repair that fail when the Fanconi
anemia pathway is compromised. Although at
present we cannot determine whether the inser-
tion or incision steps occur first, it is widely en-
visioned that incisions must precede insertion
(2). In this view, FANCI-FANCD2might directly
promote incisions and thereby affect TLS indi-
rectly (fig. S13A). For example, FANCI-FANCD2,
which contains no apparent nuclease domains,
could promote dual incisions by recruiting the
Slx4 nuclease complex to the lesion (17). How-
ever, we cannot rule out the converse scenario, in
which TLS precedes incisions (fig. S13B), which
would involve translesion DNA synthesis past an
ICL (18). In this case, the primary function of
FANCI-FANCD2might be to promote TLS, per-
haps via interaction with the ubiquitin-binding
domains of Rev1. This model is consistent with
genetic epistasis between TLS polymerases and
the FA pathway (19), as well as reduced damage-
dependent mutagenesis in FA cells (20). Finally,
FANCI-FANCD2 might directly control both the
incision and insertion steps (fig. S13C). Future
experiments will be required to establish a mo-
lecular model of how FANCI-FANCD2 regu-
lates the incision and/or TLS machineries during
replication-coupled ICL repair.
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Indirect Punishment and Generosity
Toward Strangers
Aljaž Ule,1,2*† Arthur Schram,1* Arno Riedl,3* Timothy N. Cason4*
Many people incur costs to reward strangers who have been kind to others. Theoretical and
experimental evidence suggests that such “indirect rewarding” sustains cooperation between unrelated
humans. Its emergence is surprising, because rewarders incur costs but receive no immediate benefits.
It can prevail in the long run only if rewarders earn higher payoffs than “defectors” who ignore
strangers’ kindness. We provide experimental evidence regarding the payoffs received by individuals
who employ these and other strategies, such as “indirect punishment” by imposing costs on unkind
strangers. We find that if unkind strangers cannot be punished, defection earns most. If they can be
punished, however, then indirect rewarding earns most. Indirect punishment plays this important role,
even if it gives a low payoff and is rarely implemented.
Indirect reciprocity is widespread in human so-cieties. It occurs when we incur costs to re-ward those we know have been kind to others
or punish those we know have been unkind to
others. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputa-
tion and helps to enforce trustworthy behavior
between individuals who do not know each other
and who may not meet again. Such encounters
form a substantial part of our interactions and are
especially frequent in online commerce.












Indirect reciprocity is at work, for example,
when someone financially supports anonymous
volunteers working at food banks that help the
poor, even though this person does not face the risk
of ever needing a food bank’s services. The donor’s
helping behavior is, therefore, called indirect
rewarding. Such costly indirect rewarding is
thought to be a key factor in the evolution of
human cooperation (1–4). Experimental research
(5–8) and theoretical considerations (9–11) sug-
gest that indirect rewarding can sustain cooper-
ation among unrelated humans. However, there
is little empirical evidence about the long-term
performance of indirect rewarding itself. People
who engage in costly rewarding may lose out in
the long run against “defectors” who never re-
ward and thus avoid the associated costs. Even if
good reputation is rewarded (12), indirect reward-
ers might lose out against “cautious defectors”
who are generous only to avoid a bad reputation.
Indirect reciprocity may also take the form of
costly indirect punishment. Though punishment
has been observed to be important for promoting
cooperative behavior in direct encounters (13),
recent theoretical work suggests that it may be
only marginally relevant when interaction is
indirect (14). Empirical evidence on the use of
indirect punishment and its long-term perform-
ance is missing, however.
We provide experimental evidence of human
behavior in an anonymous environment where
individuals can indirectly reward and punish. We
determine the occurrences of different types of
behaviors, including indirect rewarding, indirect
punishment, defection, and cautious defection,
among human participants and determine their
payoff performance.
Our experimental design builds on the so-
called “indirect helping game” (5, 8, 9). In total,
140 participants are repeatedly (100 rounds),
anonymously, and randomlymatched into donor-
recipient pairs. Because roles are determined
randomly, participants will typically be the donor
in approximately half of the rounds. In the indirect
helping game, only donors make decisions. In any
round, each donor first observes the recipient’s
recent behavior in the role of donor and then
decides whether to “help” the recipient or to “pass.”
Helping is costly for the donor and beneficial for
the recipient, with the benefits exceeding the costs.
In earlier experiments, indirect punishment was
not available as an option, a restriction that is
arguably not a realistic feature of human inter-
actions (13–16). In our experiment, the donor can
choose to “hurt” the recipient instead of passing or
helping.Hurting is costly for the donor, butwe vary
its impact on the receiver. We conducted two
treatments that differ only in this impact, which
allows us to isolate the effect of indirect punishment
on the payoff performance of different types of
behavior. In our main treatment [harmful punish-
ment (HP)], a hurt recipient loses 250 units of our
experimental money, “francs.” In the control treat-
ment [symbolic punishment (SP)], a hurt recipient
loses or earns no francs. We say that punishment
is harmful in HP but only symbolic in SP. In both
treatments, the donor loses 50 francs for hurting
or 200 francs for helping, and the recipient earns
250 francs when he or she receives help. Passing
does not affect either player’s payoff. In both treat-
ments the recipient observes the donor’s action.
Treatment SP is a control for HP, because it iden-
tifies differences in behavior between environ-
ments where indirect punishment has material
consequences for the recipient and where it does
not, while holding all other parameters constant
across treatments (17–19).
Before choosing an action, donors observe a
part of their recipient’s donating history. A donor
always learns his or her recipient’s three most
recent actions (first-order information) and, for a
small price, can access the first-order information
their recipients observed when making these de-
cisions (second-order information). For treatments
HP and SP, we collected data for, respectively,
8 and 6 independent cohorts of 10 participants.
The aggregate frequency (60.7%) of helping
choices in our experiment falls within the range
(50 to 85%) observed in experiments without the
option of indirect punishment (5, 8). Comparing
HP to SP surprisingly shows that, in spite of the
possibility of imposing costs on uncooperative
recipients in HP, the two treatments exhibit no
significant differences in average helping rates.
Donors choose help with 60.0% frequency, on
average, across the six cohorts in SP and 61.2%
frequency, on average, across the eight cohorts in
HP. This difference is not significant (z = −0.065,
P = 0.95, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test, N =
14 cohorts). Because behavior in both treatments
displays a pronounced endgame effect, we restrict
our analysis to the first 90 rounds (17).
In SP, punishment is very rare (1.1%), which
is not surprising because it is costly for the donor
but only symbolic to the recipient. When pun-
ishment is harmful (HP), it is used significantly
more often (z = −2.207, P = 0.027, two-sided
Mann-Whitney U test, N = 14) but still infre-
quently (3.4%). In both treatments, donors typ-
ically reward kind behavior with helping. When
the recipient’s history reveals unkind behavior
toward others, donors more often pass than hurt.
This preference for passing may explain why the
punishment option in HP fails to increase coop-
eration beyond levels obtained without an option
to punish (5, 8). The infrequent use of punish-
ment in our indirect reciprocity game seems to
contrast the experimental results from public
goods games with direct punishment, where fre-
quent punishment of defectors sustains coopera-
tion in the short (13, 20) and intermediate run
(21). This difference in results might be driven by
the structural differences between the games. In
our indirect reciprocity game, each action is in-
direct and targeted at a single person. In contrast,
only punishment can be targeted at a specific
person in public goods games, whereas any other
action affects every member of the group. In
combination with the difference in parameters,
this may explain the level of punishment we
observe (17).
Recent evidence suggests that human reci-
procity is driven to a large extent by stable be-
havioral strategies (22–24), and a rich set of such
strategies has been identified in recent models of
evolution of indirect reciprocity (1, 9, 10). We
consider seven prominent behavioral strategies and
assess their payoff performance. These strategies
are partitioned along the different ways a donor
may use his or her own history or that of the
recipient when choosing an action (10).
The first partition distinguishes between
“discriminate” and “indiscriminate” strategies.
An indiscriminate strategy does not condition an
action on the donor’s or recipient’s histories. For
example, “indiscriminate altruism” always pre-
scribes help, and “indiscriminate defection” always
prescribes pass.
The second partition divides discriminate
strategies into those with selfish concern (“self-
regarding”) and those with concern for others
(“other-regarding”). The strategy “cautious
defection” employs occasional helping to main-
tain the donor’s good reputation. In particular, it
prescribes to help only when the donor’s own
1Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political
Decision-Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Roeters-
straat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands. 2Faculty of
Mathematics, Natural Sciences and Information Technologies,
University of Primorska, Glagoljaška 8, 6000 Koper, Slovenia.
3Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University, Post
Office Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands. 4Depart-
ment of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue
University, 100 South Grant Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907–
2076, USA.
*All authors contributed equally to this work.
†To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail:
a.ule@uva.nl
Table 1. Strategies in the indirect reciprocity game with punishment. The percentages of
individuals identified with a strategy are given in parentheses, with their percentage in SP shown
first and their percentage in HP shown second.
Self-regarding Other-regarding
Indiscriminate Defectors Altruists
(9.6%, 10.5%) (7.7%, 9.2%)
Discriminate Cautious defectors Rewarders Punishers
(7.7%, 10.5%) Image Standing Image Standing
(50.0%, 39.5%) (25.0%, 17.1%) (0%, 5.3%) (0%, 7.9%)












history shows little helping. Thus, it is discriminating
and self-regarding (10).
Strategies that do condition actions on the
recipient’s history are discriminate and other-
regarding.We focus on the “reciprocal” strategies
that prescribe help only to those recipients whose
history reveals frequent helping. The third par-
tition divides the reciprocal strategies between
“punishing” strategies that use the possibility to
hurt unhelpful recipients and the “rewarding”
strategies that do not.
The fourth partition divides the reciprocal
strategies on the basis of the type and amount of
information they use. This allows us to distinguish
between standing and image scoring (1, 9, 10, 25).
An individual’s “image score” and “standing” are
statistics that summarize his or her reputation (9, 10).
A person’s image score decreases when he or she
passes and increases when he or she helps, whereas
a person’s standing decreases only when he or she
passes on a recipient with a good reputation. An
image-scoring strategy prescribes helping only
those recipients with a high image score (9), and
a standing strategy prescribes helping only those
with high standing (10). Specifically, a standing
strategy prescribes that a donor base his or her
action not only on the first-order information
about the recipient but also on the underlying
second-order information. The latter indicates what
the recipient knew about his or her recipient when
choosing past actions as a donor. Using the com-
bination of the final two partitions, we distinguish
between “image rewarding,” “image punishing,”
“standing rewarding,” and “standing punishing.”
Because of the availability of hurting and the
limits on the observable history in our experi-
ment, we consider approximated standing and
image-scoring strategies.
For each participant, we determine whether
his or her actions across rounds 1 to 90 are con-
sistent with any single behavioral strategy. De-
tails and a graphic depiction of our classification
procedure are provided in the supporting online
material (SOM) (17). We refer to classified par-
ticipants as rewarder, punisher, etc. Table 1 sum-
marizes the identified strategies and shows for
each the proportion of participants using that par-
ticular strategy. Almost all participants (SP: 86.7%;
HP: 95.0%) can be classified. More classified
participants use image-scoring strategies than
standing strategies; among them, there are more
rewarders than punishers. The next-largest frac-
tions are those of indiscriminate and cautious de-
fectors, with approximately half of them being
cautious. The smallest group is formed by indis-
criminate altruists.
Little is known about the payoff consequences
of using various strategies in indirect reciprocity
games (12, 26). Such information is important
because a strategy can flourish in the long run
only if it yields a higher benefit than the alternatives.
We consider the identified strategies and calculate
the average cohort payoff generated by each of
them (Fig. 1). For each participant, we calculate, in
francs, the average earnings as a donor plus average
earnings as a recipient across rounds 1 to 90. The
payoff for a strategy is calculated for each cohort
where the strategy is observed, as the average
payoff across the participants using this strategy.
These payoffs per cohort are used in our statistical
analysis; however, it is the relative fitness of a
strategy that determines its long-term success.
Figure 1, therefore, shows for each treatment the
average payoff of each strategy relative to the
treatment average payoff. This relative payoff is
calculated as [(average payoff of all participants in
treatment using a particular strategy) – (average
treatment payoff)]/(average treatment payoff).
Figure 1 reveals important payoff differ-
ences between the two treatments. In treatment
SP, the indiscriminate defectors fare best (average
payoff = 23.69 francs). Compared with the com-
bined classes of defectors (20.96), the combined
rewarders (13.28) earn significantly less (P= 0.044,
two-sidedWilcoxon signed-ranks test,N = 5 paired
observations); the altruists fareworst, and not only
when compared with the defectors (4.79). Hence,
defection outperforms all other strategies. In treat-
ment HP, the payoffs are markedly different. The
cautious defectors (14.23), image rewarders (14.80),
and standing rewarders (13.80) are more suc-
cessful than the indiscriminate defectors (6.16).
Even if we combine the two classes of defectors
(10.20), the combined rewarders (14.50) earn sig-
nificantly more (P = 0.068, two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test, N = 8 paired observations).
Noticeably, the punishment strategies, which are
used only in HP, are among the least success-
ful (6.4).
The stark difference in the ranking of earnings
across the two treatments is caused mainly by the
distinctly lower earnings of indiscriminate defec-
tors in HP, as compared with SP (z = 1.715, P =
0.086, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test, N = 9).
This is a direct consequence of harmful punish-
ment. The slightly higher punishment rate in HP
(3.4%) than in SP (1.1%) is almost entirely
directed toward defectors (SP: 1.6%; HP: 12.8%)
(z = 1.976, P = 0.048, two-sided Mann-Whitney
U test, N = 9) and cautious defectors (SP: 1.2%;
HP: 5.2%) (z = 1.375, P = 0.169, two-sided
Mann-Whitney U test, N = 8). Hence, though
harmful punishment is rare, it substantially
reduces defectors’ earnings and changes the
ranking of earnings among strategies.
Our results regarding the effects of indirect
punishment complement recent experimental
research showing that costly direct punishment
may disfavor individuals and groups in repeated
direct interactions with strangers, at least in the
short run (27–29). However, our earnings com-
parisons across treatments reveal that, in indirect
reciprocity games, punishment does not need to
be frequent to promote the relative success of
reward strategies. Theoretical models of indirect
punishment investigating its long-term effects on
cooperation are just starting to emerge (14). Our
study can aid the development of such models by
showing that indirect punishment, although rare,
can support human cooperation.
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Fig. 1. Average and relative payoffs of the different strategies in SP (A) and in
HP (B). Numbers inside the graph indicate average payoffs per round (in francs) of
different strategies. Bars indicate the average payoffs of different strategies relative
to the average payoffs across all participants in the respective treatment, and error
bars indicate T1 SE of these average relative payoffs. Tables S1 to S3 in the SOM
(17) provide detailed information of payoffs for each strategy, cohort, and individual.
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On the Origin of Species by Natural
and Sexual Selection
G. Sander van Doorn,1,2*† Pim Edelaar,3,4,5* Franz J. Weissing3
Ecological speciation is considered an adaptive response to selection for local adaptation. However,
besides suitable ecological conditions, the process requires assortative mating to protect the
nascent species from homogenization by gene flow. By means of a simple model, we demonstrate
that disruptive ecological selection favors the evolution of sexual preferences for ornaments that
signal local adaptation. Such preferences induce assortative mating with respect to ecological
characters and enhance the strength of disruptive selection. Natural and sexual selection thus work
in concert to achieve local adaptation and reproductive isolation, even in the presence of
substantial gene flow. The resulting speciation process ensues without the divergence of mating
preferences, avoiding problems that have plagued previous models of speciation by sexual selection.
Even as we commemorate the 150th an-niversary of Darwin’s On the Origin ofSpecies (1), discussion continues on
whether speciation is adaptive (that is, driven by
selection) and to what extent it is inhibited by
gene flow (2–7). Ecological conditions can in-
duce natural selection for local adaptation (2, 8),
but disruptive or diversifying selection is usually
not sufficient for speciation if individuals can mi-
grate between habitats. In such cases, a mating
structure has to emerge that strongly reduces
hybridization between ecologically specialized
populations (3–5).
Sexual selection is likely to play a pivotal role
in shaping such a mating structure during in-
cipient speciation (9) and has been suggested to
induce speciation by causing the divergence of
mating preferences between two emerging species
(9–13). Yet speciation due to diverging mating
traits is controversial, because existing theoretical
models can explain the divergence of mating pref-
erences only under conditions that are rarely met
in nature (10, 13, 14). Moreover, the models tend
to rely on Fisherian sexual selection to generate
reproductive isolation. Fisher’s runaway process
of sexual selection involves preferences for arbi-
trary ornaments that reflect nothing but attractive-
ness (15). The runaway process could thus
potentially evolve in different directions, allow-
ing the divergence of preferences during specia-
tion. However, mating preferences are generally
not arbitrary but act on ornaments that indicate
genetic or phenotypic quality (15–17), providing
choosy individuals with either direct benefits
or good genes for their offspring (15, 18–20).
The adaptive directionality of mate choice based
on such indicator traits makes it difficult to con-
ceive how this process could lead to the diver-
gence of preferences between two nascent species.
By means of the following scenario, we will
demonstrate that the divergence of mating pref-
erences is not required for sexual selection to
contribute to speciation. We consider a patchy
environment that imposes contrasting selection
pressures on an ecological character like a food-
exploitation strategy (Fig. 1). We assume that
across all habitats, intermediate ecological strat-
egies, on average, do worse than specialist strat-
egies optimizing the use of one of the habitats.
Accordingly, natural selection is stabilizing
within habitats but disruptive at the level of the
entire population.
Individual-based computer simulations [based
on Levene’s “soft-selection”model (21), also see
supporting online material (SOM)] that imple-
ment this ecological scenario highlight the over-
powering effect of gene flow (Fig. 2A). Although
disruptive selection removes individuals with
intermediate phenotypes from the population,
such individuals are created anew every gener-
ation as a result of migration between the habitats
and recombination between different specialist
genotypes. This process prevents the popu-
lation from splitting into two locally adapted
species, unless disruptive selection is unusually
strong.
Having observed that ecological disruptive
selection per se is not sufficient to result in spe-
ciation, we next consider an ornament, such as
a plumage characteristic, that is expressed in a
condition-dependent manner (15, 22, 23). In-
dividuals adapted to the local environment are
likely to be in a better condition, allowing them to
develop brighter plumage than individuals that
are less well adapted (24). Thus, by virtue of its
condition-dependent expression, the ornament
functions as an indicator for the degree of local
adaptation (25–27).
Assuming that the ornament is expressed in
males and that females are the choosy sex, one
would expect females to evolve a preference for
elaborate ornamentation, thereby using the infor-
mation on local adaptation revealed by the male’s
ornament (26). Simulations that allow for the evo-
lution of a preference and condition-dependent
ornamentation [following (17); also see SOM]
confirm this expectation (Fig. 2C). Starting from a
randomly mating population (p = t = 0 at genera-
tion 0), female choosiness (p) evolved along with
a concurrent increase in the resources invested by
males in their ornament (t) to signal their eco-
logical performance. The evolutionary process is
driven by sexual selection and fueled by rare mu-
tations introducing variation in female choosiness
and male ornamentation. In our model, mating
with a locally adapted partner is beneficial to a
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Cheaper Cooperation
In the context of public goods games in which optimal benefit is achieved when all participants contribute, bad behavior
cannot always be deterred by direct punishment, and has the added disadvantage that the punisher may suffer a cost.
Alternatively, instead of punishment, rewarding those who contribute can be effective in encouraging and maintaining
widespread cooperation, with the added plus that group benefits are not diminished by the costs of punishment. But
Ule et al. (p. 1701) discovered experimentally that if someone is treated depending on how they have behaved in
previous interactions, retaining the option to occasionally apply punishment shifts the payouts to favor cooperators
more than defectors.
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